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THE HELLER PROMISE VERSUS THE
HELLER REALITY: WILL STATUTES
PROHIBITING THE POSSESSION OF
FIREARMS BY EX-FELONS BE UPHELD
AFTER BRITT V. STATE?
Deborah Bone ∗
I. INTRODUCTION
With its decision in Britt v. State, 1 the North Carolina Supreme Court
became the first court in the country to hold that a statute criminalizing
firearm possession by an ex-felon is unconstitutional as applied to the
challenging plaintiff under a state constitution.2 In the wake of the United
States Supreme Court’s rulings in District of Columbia v. Heller 3 and
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 4 will other state and local statutes prohibiting
the possession of firearms by ex-felons be upheld? A close reading of both
Britt and Heller in light of many of the firearm regulatory schemes
currently in place in various jurisdictions indicates that felon possession
statutes may very well be in danger, despite the Heller majority’s
unsupported assertion that these regulations are “longstanding” and
“presumptively lawful.” 5

∗
J.D. Candidate, Northwestern University School of Law, May 2011; B.A.,
Pennsylvania State University, 2006. Many thanks to all who assisted me in completing this
Comment. In particular, I would like to thank Dorothy Roberts for her comments and
suggestions.
1
Britt v. North Carolina, 681 S.E.2d 320 (N.C. 2009).
2
Id. at 321.
3
District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2797 (2008) (holding that the Second
Amendment creates an individual right to bear arms). Many state constitutions have
amendments that have provisions similar to the Second Amendment that would present
issues for upholding regulatory schemes. See, e.g., CONN. CONST. art. I, § 15; MO. CONST.
art. I, § 23; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 30.
4
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010).
5
Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2816–2817, 2817 n.26.
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The question of whether states can lawfully prevent ex-felons from
firearm possession merges Second Amendment jurisprudence with the
debate over the reintegration of ex-felons and restoration of their rights. In
this Comment, I argue that it will be difficult for regulations that prevent
certain nonviolent ex-felons from possessing firearms to withstand scrutiny
if firearm possession is indeed an individual right as Heller and McDonald
suggest. 6
Part II of this Comment will explore the various state and federal felon
firearm possession regulatory schemes in place throughout the country.
Part III will discuss and analyze the North Carolina Supreme Court’s
decision in Britt v. State and the particular facts that led the court to
determine that the North Carolina statute was unconstitutional as applied.
Part IV will suggest that the ruling in Britt v. State could easily occur in
other jurisdictions, both local and federal, and evaluates whether the
relevant felon possession statutes in particular jurisdictions will withstand
constitutional scrutiny in light of Heller and McDonald. Part V of the
Comment will consider whether nonviolent ex-felons should, in fact, be
prevented from firearm possession after they have completed their
sentences, and Part VI will suggest methods available to revise felon
possession statutes to ensure that they both protect the rights of ex-felons
and withstand scrutiny under an individual rights model.
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW REGARDING EX-FELONS AND
FIREARM POSSESSION
A. FEDERAL LAW

The Second Amendment of the United States Constitution protects
“the right of the people to keep and bear [a]rms.” 7 The Federal Firearms
Statute, however, prohibits the possession of a firearm by any person “who
has been convicted in any court of . . . a crime punishable by imprisonment
for a term exceeding one year.” 8 The federal statute establishes an

6

In Heller, the Court shifted from the premise that the Second Amendment protected a
collective right to bear arms (i.e. the right to bear arms in a militia) to an individual rights
approach. Compare id. at 2797, with Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 65 n.8 (1980)
(upholding restrictions on the use of firearms in part because the Second Amendment
protects only a collective right to bear arms). The Court continued to operate under an
individual rights approach in McDonald. 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3036 (2010).
7
The Second Amendment provides that “[a] well regulated Militia, being necessary to
the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be
infringed.” U.S. CONST. amend. II.
8
18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006).
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exception for ex-felons who have had their civil rights restored by the
sentencing jurisdiction from the otherwise broad prohibition against firearm
possession, provided that the state restoration of rights does not otherwise
restrict possession. 9 Several circuit courts have interpreted this exception to
mean that “[i]f state law has restored civil rights to a felon, without
expressly limiting the felon’s firearms privileges, that felon is not subject to
federal firearms disabilities.” 10 Additionally, until 1961, the Federal
Firearms Act was also limited in that it only prohibited ex-felons convicted
of a “crime of violence” from possessing a firearm. 11
Prior to Heller, the original Federal Firearms Act was challenged in
two circuit courts under the Second Amendment, and both circuit courts
upheld the statute on the grounds that the Second Amendment did not
create an individual right to bear arms, 12 a premise that the Supreme Court
has since rejected. 13 In one case, the First Circuit particularly focused on
the fact that the appellant was not using his weapon as a “member of any
military organization or . . . us[ing] the weapon . . . in preparation for a
military career.” 14 The court went on to note that:
the only inference possible is that the appellant at the time charged in the indictment
was in possession of, transporting, and using the firearm and ammunition purely and
simply on a frolic of his own and without any thought or intention of contributing to

9

See id. § 921(a)(20). The statute provides that:

[w]hat constitutes a conviction of such a crime shall be determined in accordance with the law of
the jurisdiction in which the proceedings were held. Any conviction which has been expunged,
or set aside or for which a person has been pardoned or has had civil rights restored shall not be
considered a conviction for purposes of this chapter, unless such pardon, expungement, or
restoration of civil rights expressly provides that the person may not ship, transport, possess, or
receive firearms.

Id. (emphasis added).
10
Unites States v. Cassidy, 899 F.2d 543, 546 (6th Cir. 1990) (emphasis added); see also
United States v. Hall, 20 F.3d 1066, 1069 (10th Cir. 1994); United States v. Gomez, 911
F.2d 219, 220 (9th Cir. 1990).
11
Federal Firearms Act of 1938, ch. 850, § 1(6), 52 Stat. 1250, 1250–51 (1938), as
amended by An Act to Strengthen the Federal Firearms Act, Pub. L. No. 87–342, 75 Stat.
757 (1961). A “crime of violence” included “murder, manslaughter, rape, mayhem,
kidnapping, burglary, housebreaking; assault with intent to kill, commit rape, or rob; assault
with a dangerous weapon, or assault with intent to commit any offense punishable by
imprisonment for more than one year.” Id. at 1250.
12
See Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916, 923 (1st Cir. 1942); United States v. Tot,
131 F.2d 261, 266 (3d Cir. 1942).
13
District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2797 (2008) (holding that the Second
Amendment protects an individual right to bear arms).
14
Cases, 131 F.2d at 923.
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the efficiency of the well regulated militia which the Second Amendment was designed
15
to foster as necessary to the security of a free state.

While the United States Supreme Court has never directly ruled on the
constitutionality of prohibitions against the restoration of an ex-felon’s right
to possess firearms, the Supreme Court has, on more than one occasion,
commented in dicta on the government’s ability to regulate the possession
of firearms by ex-felons. 16
Most recently, the Supreme Court has suggested that prohibitions
against the possession of firearms by ex-felons are valid. In both District of
Columbia v. Heller 17 and McDonald v. City of Chicago, 18 the Court, in
dicta, called prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons
“longstanding” and “presumptively lawful.” 19 The Court, however, did not
cite to a single authority to support its assertion that regulations prohibiting
the possession of firearms by felons are valid. 20
Similarly, in United States v. Emerson,21 the Fifth Circuit stated, also
in dicta, that a ban on firearm possession by ex-felons “is in no way
inconsistent with an individual rights model.” 22 To support the validity of
laws preventing ex-felons from possession, the Fifth Circuit relied only

15

Id. (emphasis added).
See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3047 (2010); Heller, 128 S. Ct. at
2816–17; Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 64–65 (1980).
17
Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2783.
18
McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3047.
19
Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2816–17. The D.C. Circuit made a similar assertion regarding
felon possession regulations: “These regulations promote the government’s interest in public
safety consistent with our common law tradition. Just as importantly, however, they do not
impair the core conduct upon which the right was premised.” Parker v. District of Columbia,
478 F.3d 370, 399 (2007) (distinguishing Lewis, 445 U.S. at 65 n.8). As discussed infra, the
Court’s holding in Lewis was eroded by Heller.
20
Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2816–17 (“Although we do not undertake an exhaustive historical
analysis today of the full scope of the Second Amendment, nothing in our opinion should be
taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and
the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as
schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the
commercial sale of arms.”). The majority opinion in McDonald adopted this language
verbatim, again without any citations or support. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3047.
21
270 F.3d 203 (5th Cir. 2001).
22
Id. at 226 n.21. In Emerson, a Texas court issued a temporary injunction that, inter
alia, prevented a party to a contentious divorce proceeding from obtaining a firearm until the
proceeding was complete. Id. at 211 n.2. The court’s holding that felon possession statutes
can exist in an individual-rights model is especially noteworthy after the Supreme Court’s
ruling in Heller.
16
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upon law review articles from the 1980s to suggest that America at its
founding excluded felons from the right to bear arms. 23
The closest the Supreme Court came to ruling on the constitutionality
of felon possession laws was in Lewis v. United States. 24 In Lewis, the
petitioner challenged his conviction for felon firearm possession under the
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution by
arguing that his prior state conviction was invalid because he was not
adequately represented by counsel. 25 The Court upheld the statute, focusing
on the fact that the petitioner could have challenged the validity of his prior
conviction in state court but failed to do so.26 The Court went on to find
that:
[t]he firearm regulatory scheme at issue . . . is consonant with the concept of equal
protection embodied in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment if there is
some rational basis for the statutory distinctions made . . . or . . . [if] they have some
27
relevance to the purpose for which the classification is made.

As was the case with the earlier circuit court cases, the Supreme Court
pointed to the collective-right theory of the Second Amendment to support
the validity of the regulatory scheme, a theory that Heller has since
disposed of in favor of an individual rights model. 28 In essence, Heller’s
adoption of an individual rights theory of the Second Amendment
invalidates the holding in Lewis and wipes the slate clean of case law
23
Id. at 226 n.21 (citing Robert Dowlut, The Right to Arms: Does the Constitution or the
Predilection of Judges Reign?, 36 OKLA. L. REV. 65, 96 (1983) (“Colonial and English
societies of the eighteenth century, as well as their modern counterparts, have excluded
infants, idiots, lunatics, and felons [from possessing firearms].”); Stephen P. Halbrook, What
the Framers Intended: A Linguistic Analysis of the Right to “Bear Arms,” 49 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 151 (1986) (“[V]iolent criminals, children, and those of unsound mind
may be deprived of firearms . . . .”); Don B. Kates, Jr., Handgun Prohibition and the
Original Meaning of the Second Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REV. 204, 266 (1983) (“Nor does
it seem that the Founders considered felons within the common law right to arms or intended
to confer any such right upon them.”). For a thorough criticism of the historical analyses
conducted in these articles, see C. Kevin Marshall, Why Can’t Martha Stewart Have a Gun?,
32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 695, 698–707 (2009).
24
445 U.S. 55 (1980).
25
Id. at 56–58.
26
Id. at 64–65.
27
Id. at 65 (internal quotation omitted).
28
Id. at 65 n.8 (“These legislative restrictions on the use of firearms are neither based
upon constitutionally suspect criteria, nor do they trench upon any constitutionally protected
liberties”); see also United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939) (holding that the
Second Amendment guarantees no right to keep and bear a firearm that does not have “some
reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia.”). But
see District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2797 (2008) (holding that the Second
Amendment protects an individual right to bear arms).
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directly supporting ex-felon possession restrictions—except, of course, that
the Heller opinion calls such laws permissible. 29
B. STATE LAW

Prior to the Supreme Court’s recent decision in McDonald v. City of
Chicago, 30 states were generally thought to have the ability to regulate
firearms pursuant to their general police powers.31 In McDonald, the Court
held that the Second Amendment applies to state regulations.32 Since the
Court’s application of the Second Amendment to state regulation is
extremely recent, it has yet to be seen how incorporation will impact state
firearm regulatory frameworks and felon firearm possession laws more
specifically.
Current state laws regulating firearms generally, as well as regulations
regarding the prohibition and restoration of firearm ownership by ex-felons
more specifically, vary greatly from state to state. Some jurisdictions, such
as Montana, essentially permit automatic restoration of all rights, including
the right to firearm ownership, upon the completion of an ex-felon’s
sentence. 33 Other states have a process by which an ex-felon can move to
have his right to firearm possession restored upon the completion of his
sentence, usually by petitioning the court and presenting evidence that he
does not pose a danger to the community. 34 Many states have statutes
similar to the federal provisions outlined in 18 U.S.C. § 922, prohibiting
persons convicted of any felony from the possession of firearms, regardless

29

Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2816–17.
McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3036 (2010).
31
Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 264–66 (1886) (finding that the Second Amendment
“is a limitation only upon the power of Congress and the National government, and not upon
that of the States”). Of course, most state constitutions have their own provisions regarding
the right to bear arms. See, e.g., CONN. CONST. art. I, § 15; MO. CONST. art. I, § 23; N.C.
CONST. art. I, § 30.
32
McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3036.
33
MONT. CONST. art. II, § 28(2) (“Full rights are restored by termination of state
supervision for any offense against the state.”). Another method is to automatically restore
full rights after a certain number of years have passed since the completion of the felon’s
sentence. See OR. REV. STAT. § 166.270 (2007) (restoring full ownership rights after fifteen
years).
34
In Washington, for example, a felon who has not been convicted of a sex offense, a
class A felony, or a felony that carries a maximum sentence of twenty years can petition the
court for the restoration of his right to possess a firearm if he completed his sentence at least
five years prior to the date of the petition and has had no subsequent felony charges. WASH.
REV. CODE § 9.41.040(4) (West, Westlaw through all 2010 legislation).
30
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of the amount of time that has passed since the completion of the felon’s
sentence. 35
North Carolina is one of the many jurisdictions that have an outright
prohibition against the possession of firearms by ex-felons that is similar to
the federal restrictions. Under North Carolina law, it is “unlawful for any
person who has been convicted of a felony to purchase, own, possess, or
have in his custody, care, or control any firearm or any weapon of mass
death and destruction . . . .” 36 The version of the statute that was at issue in
Britt became effective in 2004. 37
III. ANALYSIS OF BRITT V. STATE
A. MR. BRITT’S STORY

In 1979, Barney Britt, a resident of Wake County, North Carolina, was
convicted of felony possession with intent to sell and deliver a controlled
substance in violation of state law.38 Britt completed his sentence in 1982
and his civil rights were restored in 1987 pursuant to North Carolina law. 39
At that time, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14–415.1 allowed ex-felons to regain their
rights to the possession of certain firearms, and Britt purchased several
sporting rifles and shotguns for use on his property. 40 In 2004, the North
Carolina legislature amended the statute making it “unlawful for any person
who has been convicted of a felony to purchase, own, possess, or have in

35

See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 571.070 (West 2009).
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14–415.1 (2009).
37
Id. as amended by Act of Aug. 12, 2004, ch. 186, § 14.1, 2004 N.C. Sess. Laws 716,
737. There were two prior versions of N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-415.1. Prior to 1995, the
statute prohibited the possession of “any handgun or other firearm with a barrel length of
less than 18 inches or an overall length of less than 26 inches” by persons convicted of
certain violent felonies, “within five years from the date of such conviction, or unconditional
discharge from a correctional institution, or termination of a suspended sentence, probation,
or parole upon such conviction, whichever is later.” Act of June 26, 1975, ch. 870, § 1, 1975
N.C. Sess. Laws 1273. Between 1995 and 2004, the statute no longer took the date of
conviction or completion of sentence into consideration, but continued to permit limited
possession of a firearm within an ex-felon’s own home or lawful place of business. Act of
July 26, 1995, ch. 487, § 3, 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 1414, 1417.
38
Britt v. North Carolina, 681 S.E.2d 320, 321 (N.C. 2009).
39
Id.
40
Id.; see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14–415.1 (1975). In 1995, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14–
415.1 was amended to prohibit certain uses of firearms by ex-felons, but the amended law
still permitted possession of firearms within the ex-felon’s home or business. Act of July 26,
1995, ch. 487, § 3, 1995 N.C. Sess. Laws 1414, 1417.
36
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his custody, care, or control any firearm or any weapon of mass death and
destruction.” 41
Before the new law became effective, Britt voluntarily handed over his
firearms to the Wake County sheriff. 42 Britt had not been charged with any
crimes in the thirty years since his first and only felony conviction, and
there had been no determinations made by any court or agency that Britt
was potentially dangerous. 43 Britt filed suit against the State, alleging that
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14–415.1 infringed his state constitutional right to bear
arms. 44
The trial court granted the State’s motion for summary judgment,
finding that the amended statute was rationally related to a legitimate
government interest and held that the law was constitutional both on its face
and as applied to plaintiff. 45 Britt appealed the trial court’s holding, but the
North Carolina Court of Appeals affirmed the finding, again holding that
the law was rationally related to a legitimate state interest.46
Britt appealed his case to the state supreme court. The only issue
under review by the court was “[w]hether the application of the 2004
amendment . . . to plaintiff violates his rights under [the North Carolina
Constitution].” 47
The Supreme Court of North Carolina held that N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14–
415.1 is an “unreasonable regulation” as applied to the plaintiff. 48 The
North Carolina constitution provides that “[a] well regulated militia being
41
Act of July 15, 2004, ch. 186, § 14.1, 2004 N.C. Sess. Laws 716, 737. The statute
makes no distinctions regarding the date of conviction.
42
Britt, 681 S.E.2d at 322.
43
Id.
44
Id. The North Carolina constitution provides, in a manner similar to the federal
Constitution, that “[a] well regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free State,
the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed.” N.C. CONST. art. I,
§ 30.
45
Britt, 681 S.E.2d at 322.
46
Britt v. State, 649 S.E.2d 402, 409 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007). Judge Elmore dissented
from the Court of Appeals’ decision, arguing that the statute unconstitutionally “stripped
plaintiff of his constitutional right to bear arms without the benefit of due process.” Id. at
410 (Elmore, J., dissenting).
47
Britt, 681 S.E.2d at 322.
48
Id. at 323 (“Based on the facts of plaintiff’s crime, his long post-conviction history of
respect for the law, the absence of any evidence of violence by plaintiff, and the lack of any
exception or possible relief from the statute’s operation, as applied to plaintiff, the 2004
version of [the statute] is an unreasonable regulation, not fairly related to the preservation of
public peace and safety. In particular, it is unreasonable to assert that a nonviolent citizen
who has responsibly, safely, and legally owned and used firearms for seventeen years is in
reality so dangerous that any possession at all of a firearm would pose a significant threat to
public safety.”).
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necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and
bear arms shall not be infringed.” 49 The state supreme court relied
primarily upon State v. Dawson, a decision where the court previously held
that any regulation on the state constitutional right to bear arms must be
“reasonable and not prohibitive, and must bear a fair relation to the
preservation of the public peace and safety.”50 Unlike the lower courts, the
state supreme court found that the State could not reasonably imply that Mr.
Britt individually possessed a significant threat to public safety. 51 The court
focused heavily on the fact that Mr. Britt’s felony conviction was for a
nonviolent crime, and that Mr. Britt had not only been a law-abiding citizen
for the past thirty years, but had also safely possessed firearms for thirteen
of those thirty years. 52
While the court only found that the law was unconstitutional as applied
to this particular plaintiff, the holding is still extremely significant in that it
is the first time any state court has held a state felon firearm possession law
to be unconstitutional on any grounds, as applied or otherwise.53
Dissenting justices argued that the statute was a reasonable regulation
both on its face and as applied to the plaintiff, and that State v. Dawson
illustrated that the right to bear arms is in fact subject to regulation. 54 The
dissent compared the statute to laws preventing mentally ill persons from
possessing firearms, noting that both regulations further the public policy of
protecting the safety and general welfare of the public at large. 55 The
dissent also cited dicta from State v. Jackson,56 where the court associated a
heightened public danger with felons possessing firearms and applauded

49

N.C. CONST. art. I, § 30.
159 S.E.2d 1, 10 (N.C. 1968).
51
Britt, 681 S.E.2d at 323.
52
Id.
53
Id. at 323 (Timmons-Goodson, J., dissenting) (“Because the majority has crafted an
individualized exception for a sympathetic plaintiff, thereby placing North Carolina in the
unique position of being the first jurisdiction, either federal or state, to hold that the inherent
police power of the State must yield to a convicted felon’s right to own a firearm, I
respectfully dissent.”) (emphasis added).
54
Id. at 323–24.
55
See id. at 324 (“In addition to regulating the place and manner in which an individual
may exercise his right to bear arms, the General Assembly may also properly regulate—to
the point of absolute restriction—certain classes of persons reasonably deemed by the
legislature to pose a threat to public peace and safety. Thus, in addition to convicted felons,
our statutes unequivocally prohibit incompetents, persons acquitted by reason of insanity of
any crime (whether violent or nonviolent), and persons subject to domestic violence orders
from purchasing, owning, or possessing firearms.”) (citations omitted).
56
546 S.E.2d 570, 573–74 (2001).
50
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N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14–415.1, which was actually slightly less restrictive at
the time of the case.57
B. THE BRITT AFTERMATH

Since, under North Carolina law, 58 Mr. Britt had his civil rights
restored after he completed his sentence, he was not prohibited from
possessing a firearm under the Federal Firearms Act unless North Carolina
prohibited possession. 59 As of yet, it is unclear whether the North Carolina
Supreme Court’s holding will automatically extend to other felons in North
Carolina who present the same absence of lawlessness and dangerousness
that Mr. Britt established. The North Carolina Court of Appeals has,
however, developed a test for similar claims in the wake of the Britt
holding. 60 A North Carolina appellate court interpreted the state supreme
court’s holding to have developed a five-factor test that evaluates:
(1) the type of felony convictions, particularly whether they “involved violence or the
threat of violence[,]” (2) the remoteness in time of the felony convictions; (3) the
felon’s history of “law-abiding conduct since [the] crime,” (4) the felon’s history of
“responsible, lawful firearm possession” during a time period when possession of
firearms was not prohibited, and (5) the felon’s “assiduous and proactive compliance
61
with the 2004 amendment.”

These factors are used to determine whether the statute “is a
reasonable regulation which is ‘fairly related to the preservation of public
peace and safety’ as to defendant.” 62
It is certainly still reasonable to assume, as did the dissent in Britt, that
additional ex-felons of more similar standing to Mr. Britt will come forward

57

Britt, 681 S.E.2d at 324 (“Just as there is heightened risk and public concern
associated with firearms on educational property, which the legislature addressed through
[N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14–269.2,] there is also heightened risk and public concern associated
with convicted felons possessing firearms, which the legislature addressed through [N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 14-415.1]. Both are exceptional situations, which have been addressed through
dedicated statutory law.” (quoting Jackson, 546 S.E.2d at 573–74 (2001))).
58
See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14–415 (2005).
59
See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) (2006).
60
State v. Whitaker, 689 S.E.2d 395, 404 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009).
61
Id. (quoting Britt, 681 S.E.2d at 322).
62
Whitaker, 689 S.E.2d at 404 (quoting Britt, 681 S.E.2d at 323). The court held that the
plaintiff in Whitaker did not pass the five-factor test and therefore the statute was not
unconstitutional as applied to him. The plaintiff in Whitaker was convicted of three
felonies—with one conviction as recent as 2005, and including a crime against a child. Mr.
Whitaker’s criminal record is therefore not comparable to that of Mr. Britt. Whitaker, 689
S.E.2d at 404–05.
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to make similar claims in the wake of the court’s holdings. 63 Indeed, the
North Carolina state legislature has already proposed revisions to the state
Felony Firearms Act to permit limited hunting privileges upon the
completion of their sentences for ex-felons convicted of nonviolent
felonies.64
IV. COULD COURTS IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS HOLD SIMILARLY TO THE
NORTH CAROLINA COURT?
Whether or not a similar holding would be possible in other
jurisdictions depends largely on the interplay between each jurisdiction’s
specific constitutional provisions protecting the right to bear arms and the
jurisdiction’s statutory framework prohibiting ex-felons from firearm
possession. 65 After McDonald, state regulations must also pass muster
under the Second Amendment. 66 Even regulations that are valid under the
Second Amendment, however, may be struck under state constitutional
theories. The following paragraphs explore state and federal firearm
regulatory frameworks to determine the viability of statutes prohibiting gun
ownership by ex-felons.
A. IMPLICATIONS FOR OTHER STATES

Many states have broad statutes similar to North Carolina’s67 that
prohibit the possession of firearms by all ex-felons, and similarly broad

63
Britt, 681 S.E.2d at 325 (Timmons-Goodson, J., dissenting) (“Today’s decision opens
the floodgates wide before an inevitable wave of individual challenges to not only the Felony
Firearms Act, but to our statutory provisions prohibiting firearm possession by incompetents
and the mentally insane.”).
64
H.B. 1444, 2009 Gen. Assem., 2009 Sess. (N.C. 2009). If passed, the bill would
permit applicants who (1) have had rights of citizenship restored; (2) have “only one felony
conviction and the rights of citizenship lost because of the conviction for that felony were
restored pursuant to Chapter 13 of the General Statutes at least 20 years before the date of
the permit application[;]” (3) have “not been convicted of any subsequent felony or any
subsequent misdemeanor[;]” and (4) have “been of good behavior for the period since the
date of conviction of the felony conviction” to possess certain firearms, provided the
applicant was not convicted of offense that include assault or the possession of a firearm or
suffers from a physical infirmity. § 14–415.42(a).
65
The Federal Firearms Act does not prohibit ex-felons who have had their civil rights
restored by the appropriate jurisdiction from possessing firearms. 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20)
(2006). Absent a change to the federal statue, only the states that restore civil rights upon
reentry, such as North Carolina, need be concerned about ex-felons gaining the ability to
own firearms. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 13-1 (2009).
66
130 S. Ct. 3020, 3036 (2010).
67
See, e.g., MO. ANN. STAT. § 571.070 (West 2010).
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constitutional protections for the right to bear arms. 68 These states are most
likely to encounter challenges to their firearm possession regulations.
Several states, however, have more narrowly tailored provisions that may
better withstand challenges on individual rights grounds. 69
1. Viable State Felon Possession Laws Based on State Constitutional
Provisions
Idaho is the only state to explicitly provide in its constitution that the
state can pass legislation to prohibit a felon’s possession of firearms. 70 The
Florida constitution has a broader exception to the right, as it explicitly
qualifies that the right to bear arms “shall not be infringed, except that the
manner of bearing arms may be regulated by law.” 71 The Florida state
legislature passed a broad felon firearm possession statute that prohibits
persons convicted of any felony from owning, possessing, or controlling a
firearm. 72 In Florida, if the statute were challenged as an unconstitutional
violation of the state constitutional right to bear arms, the regulations would
most likely be upheld since the state constitution explicitly provides that the
state can regulate this right, although there still would be room for asapplied challenges. 73
2. Viable State Felon Possession Laws Based on Narrowly Drafted Statutes
Other states have more narrowly tailored statutory schemes.
Wyoming, for example, only prohibits “[a]ny person who has previously
pleaded guilty to or been convicted of committing or attempting to commit
a violent felony or a felony [against a peace officer]” from using or
possessing a firearm. 74 Wyoming’s state constitution, on the other hand, is
very broad: “The right of citizens to bear arms in defense of themselves and

68

See, e.g., MO. CONST. art. I, § 23.
Compare, e.g., WYO. CONST. art. I, § 24, with WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-8-102 (2009).
70
“The people have the right to keep and bear arms, which right shall not be abridged;
but this provision shall not . . . prevent the passage of legislation providing penalties for the
possession of firearms by a convicted felon . . . .” IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 11.
71
FLA. CONST. art. I, § 8(a) (emphasis added).
72
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 790.23 (West 2007).
73
A few other states have similar constitutional provisions giving state legislatures some
level of authority to regulate the right to bear arms. See GA. CONST. art. I, § 1, ¶ VIII; UTAH
CONST. art. I, § 6.
74
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-8-102 (emphasis added); see also, e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 159:3 (LEXIS through 2009 Sess.) (prohibiting only those who have committed a felony
against the person or property of another, or who have committed a drug-related felony from
possessing firearms).
69
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of the state shall not be denied.” 75 If the Wyoming statute were challenged,
the regulations would likely be upheld even if the same standard from the
North Carolina court were used. Under the Wyoming statute, it will be
much easier for the state to prove a legitimate state interest in prohibiting
firearm possession, since the Wyoming statute only prevents felons with a
violent history from possessing firearms, unlike the statute in North
Carolina. 76
Still, many states’ constitutional provisions and statutory schemes are
very similar to those of North Carolina. 77 These state courts could
potentially decide, as the North Carolina Supreme Court did, 78 that felon
firearm possession statutes are unconstitutional if challenged by similarly
sympathetic plaintiffs. Many felonies are nonviolent in nature, and proving
that ex-felons who commit these crimes are indeed “dangerous” may be
difficult if states do not revise their regulatory frameworks. 79 In the wake
of Britt, it is likely that more nonviolent ex-felons will come forward to
challenge state laws. 80
B. PRIOR STATE CHALLENGES

Thus far, few plaintiffs have challenged their state’s felon firearm
possession statutes on constitutional grounds, and none had done so
successfully until Britt. 81 Generally, the statutes that have been challenged
are actually less restrictive than the statute at issue in Britt. 82 Still, much of
the reasoning that the courts in previous cases relied upon has been eroded

75

WYO. CONST. art. I, § 24.
WYO. STAT. ANN. § 6-8-102 (2009); see also Britt v. State, 681 S.E.2d 320, 323 (N.C.
2009) (“In particular, it is unreasonable to assert that a nonviolent citizen who has
responsibly, safely, and legally owned and used firearms for seventeen years is in reality so
dangerous that any possession at all of a firearm would pose a significant threat to public
safety.”) (emphasis added).
77
Compare, e.g., ARK. CONST. art. II, with ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-7-103(a) (1987);
compare also CONN. CONST. art. I, § 15, with CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-217 (West
1958); MO. CONST. art. I, § 23, with MO. ANN. STAT. § 571.070 (West 2003).
78
See Britt, 681 S.E.2d at 322–23.
79
See infra Part VI for suggestions on how jurisdictions can improve their regulatory
frameworks to secure the validity of felon firearm possession laws.
80
See Britt, 681 S.E.2d at 324 (Timmons-Goodson, J., dissenting).
81
See, e.g., Posey v. Commonwealth, 185 S.W.3d 170 (Ky. 2006); State v. Hirsch, 114
P.3d 1104 (Or. 2005); State v. Smith, 571 A.2d 279 (N.H. 1990).
82
The Oregon felon firearm possession statute only excludes persons convicted of a
felony from firearm possession until fifteen years have passed after the completion of the
felon’s sentence. Compare OR. REV. STAT. § 166.270 (1998) (applied in Hirsch, 114 P.3d at
1106), with N.C.GEN. STAT. § 14–415 (2005) (applied in Britt, 681 S.E.2d at 322).
76
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by the United States Supreme Court’s holdings in Heller and McDonald. 83
If courts continue toward an individual rights interpretation of the right to
possess firearms, the precedents upholding states’ ability to restrict firearm
possession may no longer be valid case law.
In State v. Hirsch, 84 for example, the Oregon Supreme Court upheld
Oregon’s felon firearm possession statute. 85 Oregon’s constitution provides
that “[t]he people shall have the right to bear arms for the defence of
themselves, and the State, but the Military shall be kept in strict
subordination to the civil power.” 86 The state supreme court found that the
drafters of the state constitution did not intend to create an “absolute right to
the possession of arms.” 87 The court interpreted the provision as
“preclud[ing] the legislature from infringing on the people’s right to bear
arms for purposes of defense, but not for purposes other than defense.” 88
The North Carolina court did not delve into the same sort of historical
analysis of the intent of the drafters in Britt, but the Oregon case is still
easily distinguishable from the facts in Britt. The statute at issue in Hirsch
was less restrictive than the statute in Britt. 89 The Oregon felon firearm
possession statute only excludes persons convicted of a felony from firearm
possession until fifteen years after the completion of the felon’s sentence. 90
Under the North Carolina court’s reasonableness test, even the Oregon
statute probably would have been upheld considering the North Carolina
court’s focus on the remoteness of the felony conviction at issue. 91 Under
the Oregon statute, ex-felons with convictions that are particularly remote
in time would be legally able to possess firearms. 92
83

See, e.g., Posey, 185 S.W.3d at 179.
Hirsch, 114 P.3d at 1104.
85
Id. at 1106; OR. REV. STAT. § 166.270 (2009).
86
OR. CONST. art. I, § 27.
87
Hirsch, 114 P.3d at 1106, 1134 (describing the holding of the Oregon Court of
Appeals, which was ultimately upheld).
88
Id. at 1110. It is interesting to note that the Oregon court used the language regarding
“defense” much differently than the United States Supreme Court used the language
regarding “the militia” in the Second Amendment of the United States Constitution.
Compare id., with District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2791 (2008). The
Supreme Court held that the prefatory phrase regarding militias in the Second Amendment
“does not limit the latter [clause], but rather announces a purpose.” Id. at 2789.
89
Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14–415.1 (2009), with OR. REV. STAT. § 166.270 (2009).
90
OR. REV. STAT. § 166.270.
91
See State v. Whitaker, 689 S.E.2d 395, 404 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009) (citing Britt v. State,
681 S.E.2d 320, 323 (N.C. 2009)) (outlining the North Carolina court’s five-factor test,
including remoteness of the conviction as a factor).
92
Incidentally, the plaintiffs in Hirsch were not nearly as sympathetic as Mr. Britt. Mr.
Hirsch was charged with possessing a firearm while still on parole, and Mr. Friend was
84
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Another case where a state’s felon firearm possession regulations were
upheld was State v. Smith. 93 Like, North Carolina, New Hampshire has a
broad constitutional protection of the right to bear arms. 94 The New
Hampshire court upheld the state felon firearm possession statute on the
grounds that it is narrowly tailored to serve “a significant governmental
interest in protecting the general public . . . .” 95 The court focused on the
fact that the statute prohibits only “persons likely to be dangerous from
possessing dangerous weapons.” 96 New Hampshire’s statute is indeed more
narrowly tailored than the North Carolina statute. The New Hampshire
statute only prohibits the possession of firearms for those who have
committed a felony against the person or property of another, or who have
committed a drug-related felony—in essence, only prohibiting “dangerous”
felons from possessing firearms. 97
While the New Hampshire statute is less restrictive than North
Carolina’s statute, Mr. Britt committed a drug-related felony, and therefore,
if he were a New Hampshire resident he would still be prohibited from
firearm possession. 98
Kentucky’s felon possession statute has also survived scrutiny by the
state supreme court.99 Perhaps because the statute was challenged by
arguably the least sympathetic plaintiff of the three cases,100 the plaintiff in
Posey tried a notably different argument. The plaintiff did not dispute that
the “regulation of firearms among convicted felons is supported by
substantial and rational concerns.” 101 Instead, he argued that the statute
violated the state constitution because the “constitution expressly protects
the convicted felon’s right to bear arms in spite of these substantial risks to

charged with possessing a firearm while driving under the influence of intoxicants. Hirsch,
114 P.3d at 1106.
93
571 A.2d 279, 280 (N.H. 1990).
94
“All persons have the right to keep and bear arms in defense of themselves, their
families, their property and the state.” N.H. Const. pt. 1, art. 2-a.
95
Smith, 571 A.2d at 281.
96
Id.
97
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 159:3 (LEXIS through 2009 Sess.); see also Smith, 571 A.2d
at 281.
98
Britt v. State, 681 S.E.2d 320, 321 (N.C. 2009).
99
Posey v. Commonwealth, 185 S.W.3d 170, 172 (Ky. 2006).
100
The plaintiff in Posey was arrested after officers searching for a different suspect
found and seized shotgun shells, individually wrapped packets of marijuana, and a firearm in
plain view in plaintiff’s home. Id.
101
Id. at 176.
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public welfare and safety.” 102 Nevertheless, the Kentucky court was not
convinced. 103
Kentucky Revised Statute § 527.040 prohibits the “possession of a
firearm by a convicted felon . . . when he has been convicted of a felony, as
defined by the laws of the jurisdiction in which he was convicted.” 104 The
Kentucky Constitution, on the other hand, provides that:
All men are, by nature, free and equal, and have certain inherent and inalienable
rights, among which may be reckoned . . . . The right to bear arms in defense of
themselves and of the State, subject to the power of the General Assembly to enact
laws to prevent persons from carrying concealed weapons. 105

The Kentucky Supreme Court used the single footnote in Emerson106
to find that, historically, felons were not permitted to possess firearms. 107
The court also found, as the Oregon court did, that the “defense” language
in the state constitution illustrated that the right to bear arms was not
absolute. 108 Taken together, the court determined that the statute is
“‘reasonable legislation in the interest of public safety’ [and] since nothing
in the constitution, either express or implied, undermines or prohibits such
legislation, [the statute is] constitutional.” 109

102

Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 177.
104
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 527.040(1) (2010). The statute, however, only applies to
persons convicted after January 1, 1975 with respect to handguns, and only applies to
persons convicted before July 15, 1994 with respect to other firearms. Id § 527.040(4). If
Mr. Britt were a Kentucky resident, he would not have been prevented from possessing the
rifles, since his felony conviction occurred prior to the statute.
105
KY. CONST. § 1.
106
United States v. Emerson, 270 F.3d 203, 226 n.21 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing scholarship
that claims that at America’s founding, ex-felons were not considered to be citizens). See
supra note 22.
107
Posey, 185 S.W.3d at 178. The dissent vehemently disputed this historical analysis.
See id. at 198–200 (Scott, J., dissenting).
108
Id. at 180. It is interesting that the court focused on the self-defense language to show
that the right to bear arms is not absolute, instead of focusing on the language explicitly
permitting the legislature to “enact laws to prevent persons from carrying concealed
weapons.” It is also curious that the constitutional provision explicitly provides for
prohibitions against concealed weapons, but not against felon firearm possession. KY.
CONST. § 1(7). Several other states have similar provisions regarding concealed weapons in
their state constitutions. See, e.g., COLO. CONST. art. II, § 13; LA. CONST. art. I, § 11; MISS.
CONST. art. III, § 12; MO. CONST. art. I, § 23; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 12; N.M. CONST. art. II,
§ 6; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 30. However, none of these constitutions say anything regarding
felon possession. Only Idaho’s constitution specifically permits laws against felon
possession. IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 11.
109
Posey, 185 S.W.3d at 181 (internal citations omitted).
103
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If the North Carolina court dealt with the same facts and law at issue in
Posey, it would likely still have found the statute unconstitutional as applied
to Mr. Britt, but not as applied to Mr. Posey. The major difference between
the two cases is the dangerousness, or at least lawlessness, of the two
plaintiffs. Mr. Posey was found possessing a firearm while engaging in
other illegal acts, 110 whereas Mr. Britt had been a law-abiding member of
the community for thirty years.111 According to the North Carolina
appellate court’s five-factor test, the type of felony conviction is heavily
considered in a determination of whether the statute is constitutionally
applied. 112
Not every state court will follow North Carolina’s lead and poke holes
in its state’s felon firearm possession statutes, but there is certainly the
potential for finding that many of these statutory schemes are
unconstitutional, at least as applied to particular plaintiffs. This possibility
is strengthened when considering the ever-growing class of ex-felons who
were convicted of nonviolent felonies. 113
C. IMPACT ON FEDERAL LAW

While North Carolina’s ruling has no direct effect on federal law, the
state’s decision may foreshadow the direction future federal decisions could
take, especially given the recent federal court decisions on Second
Amendment jurisprudence. 114
In District of Columbia v. Heller, the Court interpreted the Second
Amendment as an individual right to bear arms. 115 The majority in Heller
declared that its decision did not impact the validity of felon firearm
possession restrictions. 116 The Court noted the prohibitions on the
possession of firearms by felons were “longstanding” and “presumptively
lawful,” but did not cite any supporting authorities.117 The Court made this
110

Id. at 172.
Britt v. State, 681 S.E.2d 320, 323 (N.C. 2009).
112
State v. Whitaker, 689 S.E.2d 395, 404 (N.C. Ct. App. 2009) (citing Britt, 681 S.E.2d
at 322).
113
Every year, state courts convict about 800,000 additional nonviolent felons. See
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE
COURTS, 2004, at 1 (2004), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/fssc04.pdf.
114
See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3036 (2010); District of Columbia
v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2797 (2008).
115
Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2797. Coincidentally, the Court specifically notes that North
Carolina’s constitutional provision providing for the right to bear arms is very similar to the
Second Amendment. Id. at 2802.
116
Id. at 2816–17. The Court repeated this assertion in McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3047.
117
Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2816–17.
111
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assertion despite its lengthy review of the drafting history of the Second
Amendment, and subsequent conclusion that the right to bear arms was
considered a fundamental, individual right related to the right of selfdefense. 118 The Court even quoted eighteenth century scholars such as
William Rawle to suggest that, at founding, it was believed that the
government had no “power to disarm” the people whatsoever. 119
The lack of supporting authorities for the Court’s assertion that
restrictions on a felon’s possession of firearms are “presumptively lawful”
is disconcerting. Considering the Court’s holding that the Second
Amendment secures an individual right to bear arms, federal prohibitions
against felon firearm possession may not be as secure as the Court initially
presumed. This is especially true in light of the majority’s assault on the
idea that courts should conduct an “interest-balancing” approach to
determine whether statutory burdens on a protected interest are proportional
to the effects upon other governmental interests. 120 Indeed, if an interestbalancing test is conducted, some courts may find, as the New Hampshire
Supreme Court found, that the burdens on ex-felons are proportional and
reasonable to protect the governmental interest of protecting the safety and
welfare of the public. 121 The majority in Heller, however, scoffed at the
idea of conducting an interest-balancing analysis, and noted that there is “no
other enumerated constitutional right whose core protection has been
subjected to a freestanding ‘interest-balancing’ approach.” 122 The majority
went even further to refute the idea that a rational-basis scrutiny test should
be the standard to evaluate regulations on constitutional guarantees:
[R]ational-basis scrutiny is a mode of analysis we have used when evaluating laws
under constitutional commands that are themselves prohibitions on irrational laws. In
those cases, “rational basis” is not just the standard of scrutiny, but the very substance
of the constitutional guarantee. Obviously, the same test could not be used to evaluate
the extent to which a legislature may regulate a specific, enumerated right, be it the
freedom of speech, the guarantee against double jeopardy, the right to counsel, or the
right to keep and bear arms. If all that was required to overcome the right to bear

118

Id. at 2790–2806.
Id. at 2806.
120
Id. at 2821.
121
Smith v. State, 571 A.2d 279, 281 (N.H. 1990). The New Hampshire court upheld the
state felon firearm possession statute on the grounds that it is narrowly tailored to serve “a
significant governmental interest in protecting the general public.” Id.
122
Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 2821. The Court continues: “The very enumeration of the right
takes out of the hands of government . . . the power to decide on a case-by-case basis
whether the right is really worth insisting upon. A constitutional guarantee subject to future
judges’ assessments of its usefulness is no constitutional guarantee at all.” Id.
119
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arms was a rational basis, the Second Amendment would be redundant with the
123
separate constitutional prohibitions on irrational laws, and would have no effect.

It is difficult to see how the Court can so calmly promise that felon
firearm possession prohibitions will be upheld when it so eagerly disposes
of a balancing approach to determine the validity of firearm regulatory
schemes in light of the “fundamental” rights guaranteed by the Second
Amendment.
The Federal Firearms Act created a very broad prohibition against the
possession of firearms by anyone convicted of a federal felony. 124 The
prohibition is not narrowly tailored to prevent only violent felons from
firearm possession like New Hampshire’s provision, 125 nor does the
restriction depend upon the time elapsed since the completion of the
sentence as is the case in Oregon. 126 The federal statute prohibits a person
convicted of perjury from owning a gun, for example, even if the person has
not been charged again for fifty years. 127 Considering the Court’s position
in Heller and the broad nature of the federal regulation, 128 one can see how
a plaintiff with a record similar to Mr. Britt’s could successfully challenge
the federal law as overly restrictive of the individual constitutional right to
bear arms.
V. RESTORATION OF RIGHTS UPON REENTRY
In order to adequately consider solutions that will prevent felon
firearm possession statutes from being invalidated, it is important first to
consider whether the right to bear arms should, in fact, be restored upon an
ex-felon’s reentry into the community.
The right to firearm possession is one of relatively few rights that exfelons are prohibited from exercising upon the completion of their
sentences, on both the federal and the state level. The United States
Supreme Court has, however, “recognized . . . that a legislature
123

Id. at 2817 n.27 (citations omitted).
18 U.S.C. § 922 (2006).
125
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 159:3 (LEXIS through 2009 Sess.) (prohibiting ex-felons
convicted of violent felonies from possessing firearms).
126
OR. REV. STAT. § 166.270 (2007) (prohibiting ex-felons convicted of nonviolent
felonies from possessing firearms for fifteen years after the completion of their sentence).
127
See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-209 (2009) (classifying perjury as a felony offense).
128
The Federal Firearms Act “has a strikingly large scope—a scope that might be
arguably called into question by a fair reading of Heller’s rationale . . . .” United States. v.
Abner, Civil Action No. 3:08cr51-MHT, 2009 WL 103172, *1 (M.D. Ala., Jan. 14, 2009).
The Court did not find a constitutional violation in this case, since plaintiff had a “serious
history of violent crime of the highest magnitude, including state convictions for kidnapping
and attempted murder.” Id.
124
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constitutionally may prohibit a convicted felon from engaging in activities
[other] than the possession of a firearm.” 129 In North Carolina and many
other jurisdictions, all rights other than the right to possess a firearm are
automatically restored upon the completion of the felon’s sentence. 130
Various specific crimes may result in specific burdens after the completion
of the offender’s sentence, such as sex offender registry requirements, but
no government-imposed burdens fall on such a broad group of ex-offenders
as does the prohibition against firearm possession. 131
The only civil right that is denied to the whole class of ex-felons with
some frequency is the right to vote. Only two states, however, Virginia and
Kentucky, permanently disenfranchise persons with felony convictions. 132
Maine and Vermont allow felons to vote even while serving their
sentence. 133 Most states fall somewhere in between the two, permitting
some, but not all, ex-felons to vote, or establishing a process by which
voting rights can be restored. 134 Despite the higher public tolerance for exfelon enfranchisement than for ex-felon firearm possession, the Supreme
Court has expressly ruled that there is a constitutionally valid basis for
preventing ex-felons from voting in federal elections. 135
129
Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 66 (1980) (citing Richardson v. Ramirez, 418
U.S. 24 (1974)) (disenfranchisement); De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144 (1960)
(proscription against holding office in a waterfront labor organization); Hawker v. New
York, 170 U.S. 189 (1898) (prohibition against the practice of medicine).
130
North Carolina automatically restores the rights of a convicted person upon (1)
“discharge . . . by the State Department of Correction . . . or of a parolee by the Department
of Correction;” (2) “[t]he unconditional pardon of the offender;” or (3) [t]he satisfaction by
the offender of all conditions of a conditional pardon.” N.C. GEN. STAT. § 13-1 (2009). The
statute provides similar conditions for ex-felons convicted by the federal government or
convicted by other states. Id. at § 13-1(4)–(5). Ex-felons must re-register to vote, but they
are permitted to do so freely once their sentence is served. Id. at § 163-55.
131
See, e.g., Sex Offender and Public Protection Registration Programs, N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 14-208.5, et. seq (2009).
132
See THE SENTENCING PROJECT, FELONY DISENFRANCHISEMENT LAWS IN THE UNITED
States
1
(2009),
available
at
http://sentencingproject.org/doc/publications/
fd_bs_fdlawsinusMarch2010.pdf.
133
See id.
134
See id. Many states simply require ex-felons to re-register to vote upon the
completion of their sentence.
135
In Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 56 (1974), the Court found that a California
law disenfranchising convicted felons who had completed their sentences does not violate
the Equal Protection Clause. The Court relied primarily on legislative history to conclude
that the Equal Protection Clause in Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment was not meant to
override the express exemption permitting felon disenfranchisement in Section 2. Id. at 55–
56. The Court held that the language in Section 2 prohibiting the abridgement of the right to
vote “except for participation in rebellion, or other crime” expressly permits states to
disenfranchise felons. Id. Senator Feingold and Congressman Conyers have introduced
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Research illustrates that ex-felons are most likely to become active,
lawful participants in the community if they are given the same rights and
Civil
opportunities as other community members upon release. 136
disabilities affect the ability for ex-felons to integrate fully into society
upon release. In interviews with ex-offenders, for example, researchers
have “found evidence that disenfranchisement ‘carried a sting,’ was like
‘salt in the wound,’ and ‘part of a larger package of restrictions that
confounded efforts to become normal citizens.’” 137
While there are obvious emotional and politically expedient reasons to
prohibit firearm possession by convicted felons, any limitations on rights
after the completion of a felon’s sentence should be carefully evaluated. In
2004, the most recent year for which data is available, 1,078,920 people
were convicted of a felony in state courts.138 Eighty-two percent of these
felonies were categorized as “nonviolent” felonies by the Department of
Justice. 139 Is a person convicted of a nonviolent felony actually any more
likely to commit a violent act with a firearm than someone who does not
have a prior felony conviction? Department of Justice studies show that
sixty-seven percent of felons released in 1994 were convicted of a
subsequent felony or serious misdemeanor, but there is little research
regarding the prevalence of nonviolent ex-felons who commit subsequent
violent felonies.140
Certainly, our initial impulse may be to believe that convicted felons
are more dangerous than ordinary citizens, regardless of the nonviolent
nature of their first conviction. The dissent in Britt, for example,
determined that the prohibition was reasonable because “[o]ne who has
committed a felony has displayed a degree of lawlessness that makes it

legislation to ensure ex-felons’ right to vote is restored in federal elections after the
successful completion of their sentence. See Democracy Restoration Act of 2009, H.R.3335,
111st Cong. (1st Sess. 2009); Democracy Restoration Act of 2009, S.1516, 111st Cong. (1st
Sess. 2009).
136
See, e.g., JOAN PETERSILIA, WHEN PRISONERS COME HOME: PAROLE AND PRISONER
REENTRY 105–39 (2003).
137
Id. at 133.
138
Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, State Court Sentencing of
Convicted
Felons—Statistical
Tables:
Felony Sentences
in
State
Court,
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/html/scscf04/tables/scs04110tab.cfm (last updated Sep.
9, 2010). In the same year, the federal system convicted 66,518 adult felons. Id.
139
Id.
140
Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Recidivism of Prisoners Released
in 1994, Summary Findings, available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/index.cfm?ty=tp&tid=17
(last visited Mar. 9, 2010).
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entirely reasonable for the legislature, concerned for the safety of the public
it represents, to want to keep firearms out of the hands of such a person.”141
Despite Heller’s promises to the contrary, the Supreme Court’s
determination that the right to bear arms is an individual right and its
disapproval of the interest-balancing test for firearm regulations 142 beg the
question of whether the state’s interest in a slightly safer public is strong
enough to trump the individual’s right to bear arms. Certainly, in situations
similar to Mr. Britt’s, where there is no evidence of dangerousness and thus
no obvious benefit to the state, it will be difficult for the government to
show that the law, as applied, furthers any sort of legitimate state interest.
This is particularly true given Heller’s focus on the historical tie
between the right to bear arms and the right to self-defense. 143 If this
historical analysis is taken as true, why would an ex-felon have less of a
right to self-defense than a person with no felony convictions? Taken one
step further, does a person who lives in a home with an ex-felon have less
of a right to self-defense than does a person who does not live with an exfelon? Since Heller has determined that the language of the Second
Amendment guarantees an individual right to use firearms for selfdefense, 144 firearm regulations will need to be reformed to respect the rights
of ex-offenders, especially in cases where there is no evidence that the exoffender is particularly dangerous.
VI. LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS TO ENSURE THE VALIDITY OF FELON
POSSESSION STATUTES
If courts continue to hold that the right to bear arms is a fundamental
individual right and dispose of interest-balancing tests for determining the
validity of firearm regulations, there are several options for states with
schemes similar to North Carolina’s to protect the ability to legislate classes
of citizens who may not possess firearms. If, however, the American public
and state legislatures determine, as some courts have, that the right to bear
arms is truly a fundamental right and that the government has no power to
141
Britt v. State, 681 S.E.2d 320, 324 (N.C. 2009) (Timmons-Goodson, J., dissenting).
An additional question is whether felon firearm statutes have any success in deterring and
preventing ex-felons from obtaining firearms, considering that they have shown this
tendency for “lawlessness” in the past. See Press Release, Bureau of Justice Statistics, U.S.
Dep’t of Justice, Two-Thirds of Former State Prisoners Rearrested for Serious New Crimes
(June 2, 2002), available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/press/rpr94pr.cfm (“Sixtyseven percent of former inmates released from state prisons in 1994 committed at least one
serious new crime in the following three years.”).
142
District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2821 (2008).
143
Id. at 2817–18.
144
Id. at 2797.

2010]

HELLER PROMISE VERSUS HELLER REALITY

1655

disarm, then firearm possession statutes will soon go by the wayside. If the
public really believes the right to bear arms is a basic fundamental right, 145
then the right should indeed be restored upon the completion of an exfelon’s sentence, just as other rights that are deemed fundamental are
restored in most jurisdictions. 146 The success of many of these strategies
will depend largely upon the direction that Second Amendment
jurisprudence takes in the wake of McDonald. 147
A. THE CONSTITUTIONAL DIMENSION

The surest route that states can take is to amend their state
constitutions. Currently, only Idaho’s constitution specifically permits laws
against felon possession. 148 It is certainly interesting to note that Idaho,
which revised its constitution in the late 1970s, thought to include this
provision, but other states have not followed suit.
Some states have revised their constitutions to give the legislature a
more explicit power to regulate the use of firearms, even if felon possession
is not specifically mentioned. 149 The Florida constitution, revised in 1968,
provides an example. The constitution provides that “the right of the people
to keep and bear arms in defense of themselves and of the lawful authority
of the state shall not be infringed, except that the manner of bearing arms
Unfortunately, revising a state’s
may be regulated by law.” 150
constitutional provision regarding the highly contentious right to bear arms
will not be an easy task and may simply not be feasible in many states.
Further, under McDonald, even if state regulations are valid under the state
constitution they will need to pass muster under the Second Amendment. 151
Luckily, there is a variety of more accessible options for state legislatures to
protect regulations against the possession of firearms by felons.
B. STATUTORY SOLUTIONS

First, state legislatures would be wise to consider whether it is
necessary to prohibit all convicted felons from firearm possession or
whether only violent ex-offenders should be restricted. Some states, such
as New Hampshire, implemented statutes that prohibit the possession of
145

McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3036 (2010).
See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 13-1 (2009).
147
McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3036.
148
IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 11.
149
In the wake of McDonald, constitutional revisions may be invalidated by the federal
Second Amendment. McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3036.
150
FLA. CONST. § 8(a) (emphasis added).
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McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3036.
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firearms only for those who have committed a felony against the person or
property of another, or who have committed a drug-related felony—in
essence, only prohibiting “dangerous” felons from possessing firearms. 152
Of course, as discussed earlier, it is difficult to measure whether or not
persons convicted of previous felonies are more likely to commit future
crimes with firearms. 153
Another option would be to permit nonviolent offenders to possess
firearms, but to restrict the type of firearm they may possess. This is the
current proposal in the North Carolina state legislature, where legislators
have proposed a bill to permit nonviolent offenders certain “hunting”
rights. 154 These statutes rely on the fact that most crimes conducted with
firearms are conducted with handguns rather than sporting rifles,155 but do
not explicitly evaluate the dangerousness of the ex-felon. If ex-felons
convicted of nonviolent felonies are indeed statistically more dangerous,
however, permitting even limited gun rights may be a questionable practice.
Several states have struck an interesting balance between the right to
bear arms and the public safety concern that results from ex-felon firearm
possession.
One avenue some jurisdictions have explored is the
establishment of a restoration date.156 This scheme permits the restoration
of the right to possess firearms a certain number of years after time served
and often permits automatic restoration for nonviolent, first-time
offenders. 157 Statutes with restoration date provisions permit ex-felons,

152
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 159:3 (2009); see also State v. Smith, 571 A.2d 279, 281
(1990).
153
Department of Justice studies show that sixty-seven percent of felons released in 1994
were convicted of a subsequent felony or serious misdemeanor, but there is little research
regarding the prevalence of nonviolent ex-felons who commit subsequent violent felonies.
See Press Release, Bureau of Justice Statistics, supra note 141.
154
H.B. 1444, 2009 Gen. Assem., 2009 Sess. (N.C. 2009).
155
Approximately seventy-five percent of gun-related homicides in 2005 were
committed with a handgun. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DEP’T OF JUSTICE, HOMICIDE
TRENDS IN THE UNITED STATES 137, available at http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/
pdf/htius.pdf.
156
See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 166.270(4)(a) (2007).
157
In Oregon, for example, ex-felons are prohibited from firearm possession except for
persons:

[c]onvicted of only one felony under the law of this state or any other state, or who has been
convicted of only one felony under the laws of the United States, which felony did not involve
criminal homicide, as defined in ORS 163.005, or the possession or use of a firearm or a weapon
having a blade that projects or swings into position by force of a spring or by centrifugal force,
and who has been discharged from imprisonment, parole or probation for said offense for a
period of 15 years prior to the date of alleged violation of subsection (1) of this section.

OR. REV. STAT. § 166.270 (4)(a).
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such as Mr. Britt, who have shown themselves to be law-abiding members
of the community, to regain the ability to possess certain firearms. These
statutes essentially allow ex-felons a “second chance” to prove they are
law-abiding, despite their previous convictions.
Other states allow ex-felons to request hearings to restore their gun
rights after a certain number of years have passed since their sentence was
completed. 158 These hearings give the opportunity for ex-felons to “prove”
that they are now nonviolent and law-abiding citizens despite their previous
convictions. 159 These statutes have an obvious safety advantage over
statutes that automatically restore the right within a certain number of years
because the hearings allow the opportunity for both the ex-felon and the
state to present evidence regarding possible dangerous tendencies even if
there have been no subsequent charges against the individual.160 If properly
executed, these hearings can ensure that dangerous persons are not
permitted to possess firearms, regardless of how long ago they were
convicted of a crime, instead of making broad generalization about the
dangerousness of particular types of felons. Realistically, the procedural
requirements for these hearings are not always a difficult obstacle in the
path to firearm possession. 161 Provided that the hearings are reasonably
restrictive, hearings may be the best alternative to ensure dangerous felons
are not able to possess weapons without unduly burdening the right to bear
arms of all ex-felons regardless of dangerousness.
The question remains, however, whether these statutory solutions
would rely too heavily on an interest-balancing test to be upheld—exactly
the sort of test that Heller dismisses as inappropriate for individual rights.162

158

WASH. REV. CODE § 9.41.040 (West, Westlaw through all 2010 legislation).
See Matthew R. Kite, State v. Radan: Upsetting the Balance of Public Safety and the
Right to Bear Arms, 37 GONZ. L. REV. 201, 211 (2001).
160
Id.
161
See id. The ex-felon in State v. Radan committed a felony in Montana and moved to
Washington after release. The Court held that while Montana’s automatic restoration of
plaintiff’s civil rights did not meet the hearing requirement under Washington statute, the
“facts of a felon’s early discharge from parole, accompanied by an automatic restorations of
rights, meets the statute’s meaning of an ‘other equivalent procedure,’ thus restoring a
felon’s right to possess firearms in Washington, without actually going through the hearing
process.” Id. at 202 (citing State v. Radan, 21 P.3d 255, 261 (2001)).
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District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2821 (2009) (“[N]o other enumerated
constitutional right whose core protection has been subjected to a freestanding ‘interestbalancing’ approach. The very enumeration of the right takes out of the hands of
government . . . the power to decide on a case-by-case basis whether the right is really worth
insisting upon. A constitutional guarantee subject to future judges’ assessments of its
usefulness is no constitutional guarantee at all.”).
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Thus far, however, even the North Carolina courts have refused to entirely
eliminate the interest-balancing test. 163
A final option would be to leave the statutes as they are, under an
assumption that Mr. Britt’s case is a rarity, and allow courts to deal with
plaintiffs on a case-by-case basis. Yet such a decision ignores the
likelihood that there are and will continue to be plaintiffs similar to Mr.
Britt who cannot be shown to be dangerous. If the statutes are not revised
and there are enough Britt-like plaintiffs, the statutes may be in danger of
eventually being overturned.
VII. CONCLUSION
Whether or not more jurisdictions will continue to judicially eat away
at felon firearm restrictions is yet to be seen, but Britt v. State shows that
many current state firearm restrictions likely will no longer be considered
constitutionally viable in the wake of Heller and McDonald.
Going forward, it will be important for state legislatures to continue to
consider the implications of the Supreme Court’s recent decision in
McDonald. 164 Even if the Court continues to suggest felon firearm statutes
are valid despite the incorporation of the Second Amendment against the
states, it will be difficult to prevent additional states from finding as the
Britt court did.
Unless the Court—and the country—retreat from the opinion that
Americans have an individual right to bear arms, laws preventing felons
from possessing firearms will be challenged and potentially stripped away.
According to the majority in Heller, the right to bear arms cannot at once be
inalienable and subject to restrictions. 165 Legislatures must act to ensure
that firearm restrictions remain valid to keep firearms out of the hands of
only those who are most likely to misuse them.
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